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Abstract
Parametric simulation models are developed for structural analysis of voting be-
haviors in public referendum. By decomposing the residents into eight groups, a
mechanism is established to construct transition probability matrices defined on three
states (0: undecided; 1: YES; 2: NO), thereby capturing behavioral patterns of the
residents in forming their individual opinions toward the voting date. This approach
enables one to devise a strategy concerning how to transform the formation of the
eight residential groups so as to achieve a target voting result. The validity is tested
through eight real cases of Japan and a mock public referendum.
Key Words: Voting Behavior, Public Referendum, Parametric Simulation Models, Transition
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1 Introduction
In Japan, as the municipal governments are forced, more and more, to be independent of the
central government in managing their local matters and financial needs, the importance of pub-
lic referendums has been rapidly increasing. When the local legislation for public referendum
was established in four municipalities (Kubokawa, Kochi in 1982, Yonago, Tottori in 1988,
Minamijima, Mie in 1993, and Kushima, Miyazaki in 1993) in Japan, the legislation requires
the approval of the local assembly for implementing any public referendum. Such requests
were often denied by the local assemblies and no public referendum actually took place until
1996, when the issue of whether or not a nuclear power plant should be built in a town of Maki
was subjected to a public referendum. Maki’s public referendum was approved by the town
assembly because of the pressure from people of Japan and the mass media. Prior to this public
referendum, the mayor strongly supporting to build the power plant was recalled and a new
mayor was elected from the opposition side. The voting result of the public referendum was
NO with voting ratio of 88.29 % and pro-vote ratio of 34.04 %. Since then, public referendums
∗School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University
†Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of Tsukuba
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have spread all over Japan, with the total of 142 cases between 1996 and 2004 involving 142
municipalities over a variety of issues such as whether or not to build a nuclear power plant, a
waste site, a heliport for the U.S. army and a barrage near the exit of the Yoshino river, to shrink
the U.S. army camp, and to merge into a city among others.
Voting behavior, in general, has been studied extensively in the literature, analyzing the
structural properties from many different angles and validating such results with actual data,
e.g. a game theoretic models of McKelevey (1976, 1979), Schofield (1978) and Browne and
James (1991), statistical models of Caputo (1977), Kaplan and Venezky (1994) and Singh, el. al
(1995), and Hashimoto (1997), Spatial probabilistic models of Fiorina (1976), Calvert (1985),
Enelow and Hinich (1994), Ball (1999) and Lin, et. al (1999), and models based on rational
choice theory by Brunk (1980), Austen-Smith (1987), Hansson (1992), Aldrich (1993), to name
only a few. However, the literature specifically addressing to voting behavior of public refer-
endums and the like is rather limited. Karaham and William (2004) analyzes a special election
held in 2001 in the State of Mississippi over the issue of whether or not the current state flag
is identified using regression models. Thalman (2004) deals with a public referendum held in
Switzerland to vote on three proposals for taxes for fossil fuels. Using individual data of post
referendum survey, some determinants are evaluated based on probit models of YES -NO type.
To the authors’ best knowledge, there have been no explicit models available in the literature
which give an insight into the structure of voting behaviors in public referendum. The purposes
of this paper is to fill this gap by developing parametric simulation models in a systematic man-
ner.
The voting residents are first decomposed into eight groups. A mechanism is then pro-
posed to construct transition probability matrices for the eight groups defined on three states
(0: Undecided; 1: YES; 2: NO). These matrices may change as time goes by or as the ratio
of approvers or disapprovers change, thereby capturing behavioral patterns of the residents in
forming their individual opinions toward the voting date. The underlying parameters are plenty
and it is difficult to estimate them accurately. However one set of the values of such parameters
is identified, which enables one to reconstruct, via simulation, the voting results of eight real
cases of public referendums that actually took place in Japan. Based on the set of the parameter
values, our approach is to establish three basic models (Urban Basic model, Rural Basic model,
Max-Vote Basic model) by altering the formation of the eight residential groups as well as the
voting population, where approvers and disapprovers are almost balanced with Voting Ratio ≈
2 x Pro-Vote Ratio.
The next step is to establish an algorithm for vertical expansion, resulting in 9 basic mod-
els from Urban Basic model to Max-Vote Basic model. Given one of such basic models, a
mechanism for horizontal expansion is developed by transforming those who have a tendency
to vote for YES to those who have a tendency to vote for NO while keeping the voting popu-
lation intact. The horizontal expansion is represented by 11 models with Con-Type on the left
edge, Basic-Type on the center, and Pro-Type on the right edge. Consequently, we have (Urban,
Rural, Max-Vote) x (Con-Type, Basic-Type, Pro-Type) = 9 representative models and 9 x 11 =
99 detailed models via vertical and horizontal expansions.
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The parametric simulation approach turns out to be quite robust in changes of the robust in
changes of the voting population. If the formation of the eight residential groups is kept intact,
the voting results of (Pro-Vote Ratio, Voting Ratio) remains almost the same regardless of the
voting population. Consequently, given a voting result of (Pro-Vote Ratio, Voting Ratio), it is
possible to estimate the underlying formation of the eight residential groups. This in turn en-
ables one to device a strategy concerning how to achieve a target voting result starting from an
estimated current situation by transforming the formation of the eight residential groups appro-
priately via campaign efforts and the like.
The parametric simulation approach is validated via a mock public referendum which took
place at School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University in the spring term involving 149
students. The issue was whether the final grade of a course entitled “ Introduction to Human
Ecology” should be determined by a term report or by an ordinary final exam. Based on the
set of the parameter values and the formation of the eight groups constructed from a survey, the
simulation produced the voting result of (Pro-Vote Ratio, Voting Ratio) = (53.15 %, 86.88 %)
in comparison with the actual voting result of (Pro-Vote Ratio, Voting Ratio) = (53.69 %, 88.59
%), yielding satisfactory accuracy.
The set of the values of the underlying parameters is identified in such a way that the voting
results of the eight real cases that took place in Japan can be reconstructed via simulation. In
this sense, the simulation results and their implications presented in this paper are peculiar to
Japan. However, it should be noted that the parametric simulation approach itself may be valid
in other countries where the set of the values of the underlying parameters ought to be specified
differently by reflecting the peculiarities of the country under considerlations.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Parametric simulation models are formally intro-
duced in Section 2, with a mechanism to construct transition probability matrices where details
are summarized in Appendix A. Section 3 addresses itself to establish a methodological ap-
proach for structural analysis of voting behaviors in public referendum. A set of the values of
the underlying parameters is identified in such a way that the voting results of eight real cases
in Japan can be reconstructed via simulation with satisfactory accuracy. Also discussed are the
robustness of the parametric simulation approach in changes of the voting population, and how
to estimate the formation of the eight groups given a voting result. In Section 4, the validity of
the parametric simulation approach is tested against a mock public referendum, yielding quite
satisfactory results. Section 5 is devoted to the discussion of impact of formation of the eight
residential groups on public referendum and its strategic implications. Finally in Section 6,
some concluding remarks are given.
2 Model Description
We consider a population of residents who are to make a collective decision of YES-or-NO
type over an issue through public referendum. The voting is to take place K days later. It is
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assumed that the residents are classified into eight groups, characterizing behavioral patterns of
the residents in forming their individual opinions toward the voting date. The influential rela-
tionships among the eight groups are depicted in Figure 2.1, where group l is denoted by G(l)
and G(l)→ G(l′) means that G(l) directly influences G(l′). Verbal descriptions of the eight
groups are given below.
G(1) (Convinced Approvers): those who are determined to vote for YES from the very be-
ginning and to make serious efforts to convince others in line with them.
G(2) (Adaptable Approvers): those who have not formed their opinions in the beginning but
have a tendency to vote for YES when the ratio of approvers in G(1) and G(2) increases.
G(3) (Independent Approvers): those who have not formed their opinions in the beginning,
are not influenced by others, and independently have an inclination to vote for YES.
G(4) (Convinced Disapprovers): those who are determined to vote for NO from the very
beginning and to make serious efforts to convince others in line with them.
G(5) (Adaptable Disapprovers): those who have not formed their opinions in the beginning
but have a tendency to vote for NO when the ratio of disapprovers in G(4) and G(5) increases.
G(6) (Independent Disapprovers): those who have not formed their opinions in the begin-
ning, are not influenced by others, and independently have an inclination to vote for NO.
G(7) (Local Opportunists): those who have not formed their opinions in the beginning and
have a tendency to be influenced toward voting for YES by the ratio of approvers among G(2),
G(3), G(5), G(6), and G(7).
G(8) (Global Opportunists): those who have not formed their opinions in the beginning and
have a tendency to be influenced toward voting for YES by the ratio of approvers among the
entire population.
Let N = {1, . . . ,N} be the set of the whole population. The cardinality of G(l) is denoted
by N(l) = |G(l)|, 1≤ l ≤ 8. We assume that G(l)s are mutually exclusive and exhaustive so that
(2.1) N =
8⋃
l=1
G(l); G(l)
⋂
G(l′) = /0 for l 6= l′
and
(2.2) N =
8
∑
l=1
N(l).
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Figure 2.1: Influential Relationships among Eight Residential Groups
A formation g of the eight residential groups is then defined as
(2.3) g = (g(1), ... , g(8)); g(l) = N(l)
N
, 1 ≤ l ≤ 8.
At time k, individual residents are in one of the three states: (0)Undecided; (1)YES; (2)NO.
More specifically let {Si(k) : 0 ≤ k ≤ K} be a discrete time stochastic process describing the
state of resident i ∈N at time k where , for 0 ≤ k ≤ K,
(2.4) Si(k) =
 0 if resident i is undecided at time k,1 if resident i would vote for YES at time k,2 if resident i would vote for NO at time k.
For notational convenience, we define vector stochastic processes SG(l)(k) for 1 ≤ l ≤ 8 and
0 ≤ k ≤ K where
(2.5) SG(l)(k) = [Si(k)]i∈G(l).
Given SG(l)(k) at time k for 1 ≤ l ≤ 8, individual residents independently choose their state at
time k+1 based on time-dependent transition probability matrices. Such time-dependent tran-
sition probability matrices are assumed to be common within one group, but differ from each
other across different groups significantly so that their behavioral patterns can be captured.
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In order to characterize how i ∈ G(l) forms his/her decision toward the voting date, we
assume that governing transition probability matrices would change over three time periods:
the initial stage, the middle stage, and the final stage. More specifically, let K−(l) and K+(l) be
such that 0 ≤ K−(l)≤ K+(l)≤ K and define
(2.6) U(l,k) =
 1 if 0 ≤ k < K
−(l)
2 if K−(l)≤ k < K+(l)
3 if K+(l)≤ k ≤ K.
We note that the three stages may be perceived differently across different groups.
For certain groups, governing transition probability matrices also depend on the ratio of
approvers or disapprovers in their own and other groups. Let I(l) be the set of groups influencing
G(l), i.e., from Figure 2.1, one has
(2.7)
 I(1) = I(3) = I(4) = I(6) = φI(2) = {1,2}, I(5) = {4,5},I(7) = {2,3,5,6,7}, I(8) = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}.
Corresponding to K−(l), K+(l) and U(l,k), we introduce 0 ≤ Y−(l)≤ Y+(l)≤ 1 and
(2.8) V (l,k) =
 1 if 0 ≤ d(l,k)< Y
−(l)
2 if Y−(l)≤ d(l,k)< Y+(l)
3 if Y+(l)≤ d(l,k)≤ 1,
where d(l,k) denotes the ratio of approvers among groups {G(l′)}l′∈I(l) at time k for l = 2,7,8.
For l = 5, d(l,k) denotes the ratio of disapprovers among groups {G(l′)}l′∈I(l) at time k.
Given U(l,k) = u and V (l,k) = v ( u,v ∈ {1,2,3}), the corresponding transition probability
matrix for individual residents in G(l) is denoted by
(2.9) α (l,u,v) =
 α00(l,u,v) α01(l,u,v) α02(l,u,v)α10(l,u,v) α11(l,u,v) α12(l,u,v)
α20(l,u,v) α21(l,u,v) α22(l,u,v)

where, for m,n,∈ {0,1,2},
(2.10) αmn(l,u,v) = P[Si(k+1) = n | Si(k) = m, U(l,k) = u, V (l,k) = v] for all i ∈ G(l).
In general, there are 3 x 3 = 9 transition probability matrices describing the behavioral pattern
of G(l), except that G(1) and G(4) have only one matrix, and G(3) and G(6) have 3 matrices
that are dependent on u but independent of v. For G(2), for example, one has
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(2.11) α (2,1,1) =
 α00(2) p(2){1−α00(2)} {1− p(2)}{1−α00(2)}0 1 0
1− α˜00(2) q(2)α˜00(2) {1−q(2)}α˜00(2)

.
When a resident in G(2) is in state 0 at time k with u = v = 1, the resident remains undecided at
time k+1 with probability α00(2), moves to state 1 (YES) with probability p(2){1−α00(2)},
and moves to state 2 (NO) with probability {1− p(2)}{1−α00(2)}. If his/her voting position
at time k is state 2, the resident becomes undecided with probability 1− α˜00(2), switches to
state 1 with probability q(2)αˆ00(2), and remains in state 2 with probability {1− q(2)}α˜00(2).
Reflecting a rather strong tendency of those in G(2) to vote for YES, it is assumed that once a
resident in G(2) decides to vote for YES, then the position will never be changed. In addition,
one should have 12 ≤ p(2),q(2) ≤ 1 so that the probability of moving from state 0 to state 1(YES) would be higher than that of moving from state 0 to state 2 (NO). Further details about
how to construct α (l,u,v) in (2.9) for capturing the group characteristics of G(1) through G(8)
are given in Appendix A.
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3 Methodological Approach for Structural Analysis of Public Referen-
dum
The purpose of this section is to establish a methodological approach for structural analysis of
public voting based on the parametric simulation approach discussed in Section 2 and Appendix
A. In order to define the values of the underlying parameters in a realistic setting, 8 cases of pub-
lic referendums that actually took place in Japan are plotted in Figure 3.1, where the horizontal
axis represents Pro-Vote Ratio (i.e. the ratio of YES votes among the entire voting population)
and the vertical axis corresponds to the Voting Ratio(i.e. the ratio of YES or NO votes among
the entire voting population). Further details of these cases are summarized in Table 3.1. As
can be seen in Table 3.1, five of these cases have a 10 day campaign period, whereas three of
them have a 5 day campaign period.
It should be noted that the voting results of the eight cases are all negative with Pro-Vote
Ratio < Voting Ratio2 . If the issues are questioned in a reversed manner (i.e. YES becomes NO
and NO becomes YES), one should observe the symmetric reflection of the results of the eight
real cases along the line Voting Ratio = 2 x Pro-Vote Ratio. In this case, the formation of the
eight residential groups for each real case also ought to be reversed in a similar manner, that is,
(g(2),g(3)) and (g(5),g(6)) are interchanged while g(1),g(4),g(7) and g(8) remain intact. In
consistent with this observation, our methodological approach is to establish a systematic way
to develop simulation models which cover the results of the eight real cases and their symmetric
reflections by altering the formation of the eight residential groups. For this purpose, we first
establish three basic models along the vertical line Voting Ratio= 2 x Pro-Vote Ratio, followed
by their vertical and horizontal expansions.
Table 3.1: Details of Eight Real Cases
Municipality Issue Campaign Voting Pro-Vote Voting Final
Period Population Ratio(%) Ratio(%) Approval
1 Maki, Niigata Nuclear plant 10 23,222 34.04 88.29 No
2 Mitake, Gifu Waste disposal site 10 14,884 16.41 87.50 No
3 Kobayasi, Miyazaki Waste disposal site 10 31,575 30.43 75.86 No
4 Kariwa, Niigata Nuclear plant 10 4,092 37.46 88.14 No
5 Higashisonogi, Nagasaki Merger into a city 10 7,665 37.04 83.26 No
6 Kamio, Saitama Merger into a city 5 168,297 26.56 64.48 No
7 Miyama, Mie Nuclear plant 5 8,705 28.86 88.64 No
8 Iwaki, Akita Merger into a city 5 5,427 29.96 81.24 No
3.1 Establishment of Basic Models and Specification of Underlyning Paramenter Values
Let a public voting model be described by a triplet (Population, Pro-Vote Ratio, Voting Ra-
tio) = (P, PV-R, V-R). A model (P, PV-R, V-R) is called Basic if the model has approvers and
disapprovers almost equal, i.e. PV-R ≈ V-R2 . We first aim at developing two basic models rep-
resenting a typical rural community and a typical urban community. Considering the fact that
rural areas in Japan typically achieve higher voting ratios than urban areas, we assume that the
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Figure 3.1: Pro-Vote Ratio vs. Voting Ratio for Eight Real Cases and Their Symmetric Reflections
former is located near (10,000, 40%, 80%) while the latter is approximately at (100,000, 25%,
50%). Keeping characteristics of rural and urban communities in mind, we roughly estimate
the formations of the eight residential groups for the two basic models as below.
G(1) G(2) G(3) G(4) G(5) G(6) G(7) G(8)
Rural Basic Model 5% 25% 5% 5% 25% 5% 10% 20%
Urban Basic Model 2% 3% 10% 2% 3% 10% 20% 50%
Here, those in G(1),G(2),G(3) with tendency to vote for YES and those in G(4),G(5),
G(6) with tendency to vote for NO are balanced. In rural communities in Japan, people are tied
closely through various human relationships. Accordingly, G(7) and G(8) are minority groups,
estimated as 10% and 20% of the voting population respectively. In contrast, G(7) and G(8)
clearly constitute the majority in urban communities, estimated as 20% and 50% of the voting
population. For G(1),G(2) and G(3), rural communities are likely to have more people in G(1)
and G(2) than urban communities. However the ratio of independent people in G(3) ought to
be higher in urban communities than that in rural communities.
Given the formations of the residential groups G(1) through G(8) as above, the next task is
to set the underlying parameter values so as to achive about (10,000, 40%, 80%) for the Rural
Basic model, and (100,000, 25%, 50%) for the Urban Basic model. For the parameter values
specified in Table 3.2 and the threshold values given in Table 3.3, the two basic models are
simulated and the first difference of the cumulative average of the first n-runs for PV-R and
that for V-R are depicted in Figure 3.2 as a function of n. One sees that the cumulative aver-
ages converge to a range within ±0.1% after 10 simulation runs. As we see in Table 3.4, with
campaign periods of 5 and 10 days, Rural Basic model results in (10,000, 38.58%, 76.03%)
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and (10,000, 44.85%, 83.76%), while Urban Basic model has (100,000, 25.63%, 51.15%) and
(100,000, 26.46%, 52.86%) respectively. Based on these observations, it is decided that we
adopt the parameter values and the threshold values given in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, and use 10
simulation runs throughout the paper unless specified otherwise.
Table 3.2: Parameter Values
α00(l) α˜00(l) a(l) b(l) ˜b(l) p(l) q(l) q˜(l) r(l) s(l) s˜(l) t(l) w(l)
G(1): Convinced Approvers - - - - - - - - - - - - -
G(2): Adaptable Approvers 0.45 0.8 0.95 0.8 1 0.55 0.1 - 1.1 0.01 - 0.9 0.95
G(3): Independent Approvers 0.45 0.8 0.95 - - 0.55 0.1 - 1.1 0.01 - - -
G(4): Convinced Dispprovers - - - - - - - - - - - - -
G(5): Adaptable Disapprovers 0.45 0.8 0.95 0.8 1 0.45 0.9 - 1.1 0.01 - 0.9 0.95
G(6): Independent Disapprovers 0.45 0.8 0.95 - - 0.45 0.9 - 1.1 0.01 - - -
G(7): Local Opportunists 0.8 0.6 - 0.8 1 0.5 0.9 0.1 - 0.01 0.01 0.9 0.95
G(8): Global Opportunists 0.8 0.6 - 0.8 1 0.5 0.9 0.1 - 0.01 0.01 0.9 0.95
Table 3.3: Threshold Values (1 ≤ l ≤ 8)
K−(l) K+(l) Y−(l) Y+(l)
10 day Model 4 8 0.4 0.8
5 day Model 3 4 0.4 0.8
Figure 3.2: First Differences of Cumulative Averages of Pro-Vote Ratio and Voting Ratio
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Table 3.4: Rural and Urban Basic Models
Campaign Period
Population 10 days 5 days
PV-R (%) V-R (%) PV-R (%) V-R (%)
Rural Basic Model 10,000 44.85 83.76 38.58 76.03
Urban Basic Model 100,000 26.46 52.86 25.63 51.15
3.2 Vertical and Horizontal Expansion of Basic Models
In order to cover the major area of the spread of the point (◦,•) in Figure 3.1 with simulation
results, we consider a vertical expansion of the two basic models by developing 4 basic models
between Urban Basic model and Rural Basic model in the following manner. The j-th Basic
model has a total population of 100,000− 18,000 ∗ j with the population of G(l), denoted by
N j(l), specified by
(3.1) N j(l) = N0(l)− j5(N0(l)−N5(l)), 0 ≤ j ≤ 5,
where j = 0 and j = 5 correspond to Urban Basic model and Rural Basic model respectively. As
can be seen in Figure 3.1, some real cases of public referendum experienced V-R beyond 80%.
For covering this area, we develop Basic models beyond Rural Basic model by exterpolating
(3.1) for j > 5. In this case, however, N j(l) may become negative. In order to avoid this
situation, we define
(3.2) j∗ = min1≤l≤8{ j∗l }; j∗l = max{ j : N j(l)≥ 0}, 1 ≤ l ≤ 8
and the exterpolation stops at j∗. The resulting Basic model is called Max-Vote Basic model.
The expansion of the two basic models is vertical in that the entire voting population decreases
and V-R increases as j increases while PV-R remains within a limited range.
We next consider a horizontal expansion of a Basic model, for which the entire voting pop-
ulation is kept constant and V-R remains within a limited range while PV-R varies over a wide
range from Con-Type (low) to Pro-Type (high) through Basic model at the middle point. Given
a Basic model, we develop 5 models in each side of Basic model by altering the formation of
the eight residential groups. Let NB(l) and NHi(l) be the population of G(l) for Basic model
under consideration and the i-th horizontal model respectively, −5 ≤ i ≤ 5, where i = 0 corre-
sponds to Basic model. So as to keep the V-R within a narrow range, the group population of
G(1),G(4),G(7), and G(8) are fixed, that is,
(3.3) NHi(l) = NB(l) for l = 1,4,7,8 and −5 ≤ i ≤ 5.
For G(2),G(3),G(5), and G(6), members move from G(2) to G(5) and from G(3) to G(6) as i
changes from 0 to -5. These shifts are reversed when i increases from 0 to 5. More specifically,
we define:
(3.4)
{
NHi(2) = NB(2)(1+ i5), NHi(3) = NB(3)(1+
i
5)
NHi(5) = NB(5)(1− i5), NHi(6) = NB(6)(1− i5).
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It should be noted that, for Basic model, one has NB(2) = NB(5) and NB(3) = NB(6). Conse-
quently the entire voting population remains constant over all horizontal models. We call the
horizontal model with i =−5 Con-Type, with i = 0 Basic-Type, and with i = 5 Pro-Type.
In Table 3.5, simulation results of PV-R and V-R are summarized for the nine representative
models (Urban, Rural, Max-Vote) x (Con-Type, Basic-Type, Pro-Type) with a campaign period
of 10 days. Similar results are summarized in Table 3.6 for a campaign period of 5 days. It
should be noted that one has PV-R ≈ V-R2 for the three basic models, while PV-R < V-R2 for
Con-Type models and PV-R > V-R2 for Pro-Type models. Corresponding to Tables 3.5 and 3.6,
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 exhibit these models graphically, together with other models generated by
vertical-horizontal expansions of the three basic models, the eight real cases and their symmet-
ric reflections. One sees that the major area of the spread of the real cases and their symmetric
reflections are well covered by our simulation models.
Table 3.5: Simulation Results of Nine Representative Models with 10 day campaign period
Population PV-R (%) V-R (%)
Con-Type 12.06 94.03
Max-Vote Model Basic-Type 10,000 48.62 95.30
Pro-Type 84.03 95.91
Con-Type 13.77 78.64
Rural Model Basic-Type 10,000 44.85 83.76
Pro-Type 71.49 84.56
Con-Type 15.71 52.86
Urban Model Basic-Type 100,000 26.46 52.86
Pro-Type 47.16 62.09
Table 3.6: Simulation Results of Nine Representative Models with 5 day campaign period
Population PV-R (%) V-R (%)
Con-Type 20.73 89.36
Max-Vote Model Basic-Type 10,000 45.86 90.60
Pro-Type 69.44 90.38
Con-Type 20.01 74.84
Rural Model Basic-Type 10,000 38.58 76.03
Pro-Type 60.29 79.92
Con-Type 18.60 51.21
Urban Model Basic-Type 100,000 25.63 51.19
Pro-type 34.98 53.42
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Figure 3.3: Pro-Vote Ratio vs. Voting Ratio: Simulation Results vs. Real Cases and Their Symmetric Reflections
with 10 Day Campaign Period
Figure 3.4: Pro-Vote Ratio vs. Voting Ratio: Simulation Results vs. Real Cases and Their Symmetric Reflections
with 5 Day Campaign Period
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3.3 Robustness of the Parametric Simulation Approach and Estimation of Group For-
mation for Real Cases
The parametric simulation approach discussed in the previous sections turns out to be quite
robust in changes of the voting population. Figure 3.5 depicts simulation results of the nine
representative models (Urban, Rural, Max-Vote) x (Con-Type, Basic-Type, Pro-Type) where
the voting populations are scaled by factors of 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0, while keeping the forma-
tions of the eight residential groups intact. It can be seen that both PV-R and V-R are hardly
affected by changes of the voting population. This robustness enables one to estimate the group
formation of real cases as we discuss next.
Through the vertical-horizontal expansions, we have generated 9 x 11 = 99 models. Based
on the robustness of the simulation model described above, we ignore the voting population
and let a real case be represented by (PV-R∗, V-R∗), which is known, with the group forma-
tion g∗ = (g∗(1), ... , g∗(8)) unknown. One sees that there exist three models (PV-Rm, V-Rm),
m=1, 2, 3, constituting the smallest triangle which contains (PV-R∗, V-R∗), with the respective
group formations g
m
= (gm(1), ... , gm(8)), m=1, 2, 3. It then follows that (PV-R∗, V-R∗) can
be expressed as a convex combination of (PV-Rm, V-Rm), m=1, 2, 3. The associated weights
(w(m))3m=1 can be found by solving the following simultaneous linear equations.
(3.5)
 ∑
3
m=1 w(m)PV-R(m) = PV-R∗
∑3m=1 w(m)V-R(m) = V-R∗
∑3m=1 w(m) = 1 .
The group formation g∗ of the real case is then estimated by
(3.6) g∗ =
3
∑
m=1
w(m) g
m
.
The soundness of the above approach can be confirmed by testing it through the eight real
cases described in Section 2. Table 3.7 exhibits the group formations estimated via (3.6) for the
eight real cases. Table 3.8 summarizes simulation results obtained by reconstructing the eight
real cases via simulation using the real voting populations and the estimated group formations.
Comparison of the results with the actual PV-Rs and V-Rs reveal that the differences are within
1.5%.
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Figure 3.5: Robustness of the Simulation Model in Changes of Voting Population
Table 3.7: Estimated Formations of Eight Residential Groups for Real Cases
Real Group Formation (%)
Case G(1) G(2) G(3) G(4) G(5) G(6) G(7) G(8) Total
1 6.1 27.0 2.6 6.1 39.3 3.7 6.3 8.9 100.0
2 6.0 6.5 0.6 6.0 58.8 5.9 6.5 9.6 100.0
3 4.4 20.9 6.2 4.4 20.0 5.9 12.1 26.2 100.0
4 5.9 28.3 3.3 5.9 34.4 3.8 7.1 11.3 100.0
5 4.9 33.7 7.2 4.9 14.8 3.1 10.3 21.0 100.0
6 3.4 21.8 13.2 3.4 4.4 2.3 15.4 36.3 100.0
7 6.7 18.1 1.1 6.7 57.0 3.2 4.3 2.9 100.0
8 5.7 24.5 3.0 5.7 36.3 4.5 7.5 12.6 100.0
Table 3.8: Pro-Vote Ratio and Voting Ratio by Reconstruction of Real Cases
PV-R (%) V-R (%)
Case Campaign Voting Real Simulation Real Simulation
Period Population Case (a) (b) (a) - (b) Case (a) (b) (a) - (b)
1 10 23,222 38.55 38.26 0.29 88.29 88.23 0.06
2 10 14,884 18.75 18.60 0.15 87.50 87.69 -0.19
3 10 31,575 40.18 39.60 0.58 75.86 75.50 0.36
4 10 4,092 42.52 43.91 -1.39 88.14 89.36 -1.22
5 10 7,665 54.81 55.43 -0.62 83.26 83.45 -0.19
6 5 168,297 41.56 40.89 0.67 64.48 64.06 0.42
7 5 8,705 32.40 32.50 -0.10 88.64 88.54 0.10
8 5 5,427 36.88 36.88 0.00 81.24 80.98 0.26
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4 Validation of the Parametric Simulation Approach via a Mock Public
Referendum
In general, it is awfully difficult to examine how the parametric simulation model described in
the previous sections may (or may not) realistically capture the behavioral characteristics of the
voters in public voting. In an effort to respond to this difficulty, a mock public referendum was
conducted involving 149 students who took a course entitled “Introduction to Human Ecology”
in the spring term of 2004 at School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University of Japan.
The issue here was whether or not the final grade of the course should be determined by a term
repot to be written and submitted over a five day period. If the students disapprove the proposal,
then an ordinary in-class closed-book final exam would take place. The students were also in-
formed that the difficulty level of the term report would be higher than that of the final exam.
In organizing a mock public referendum concerning this issue, the following steps were
taken over a four week period in the middle of the course. For notational convenience, the four
weeks are called Week i,1 ≤ i ≤ 4. In reality, an action taken in Week i means that the action
was taken during the class hour of the week.
1. Before Week 1
By directly communicating with the students, five students who strongly supported the pro-
posal, and another five students who opposed to the proposal and preferred the final examination
were identified. The former five students were considered to be convinced approvers belonging
to G(1), while the latter five students were understood to be convinced disapprovers belonging
to G(4).
2. Week 1
1) In the beginning of the class, a questionnaire survey was conducted to find out the current
voting position of each student, as well as to figure out later which group each student would
belong to among the eight groups G(1) through G(8). The actual questionnaire is given in
Appendix B.
2) In the end of the class, the voting result at this point in time (i.e. the numbers of students
who approved, disapproved, and were still undecided) was announced.
3) After 2), some of the students identified as G(1) or G(4) made a short presentation to
approve or disapprove the proposal respectively, followed by a ten minute discussion session
involving the whole class.
3. Week 2 and Week 3
1) In the beginning of the class, each student was asked to inform of whether he/she ap-
proved, disapproved or was still undecided at this point in time by marking an answer sheet.
2) In the end of the class, the voting result at this point in time was announced.
3) After 2), some of the students identified as G(1) or G(4) in Week 1 made a short presen-
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tation to approve or disapprove the proposal respectively, followed by a ten minute discussion
session involving the whole class.
4. Week 4
1) The final vote took place in the beginning of the class.
For examining the validity of the parametric simulation approach, the next task would be to
classify the 149 students into the eight groups G(1) through G(8) based on their responses to
the questionnaire as well as their temporal voting positions from Week 1 until Week 3. For this
purpose, the questionnaire was designed, as shown in Appendix B, to figure out the degrees of
independence, sympathy and sensitivity of individual students to local atmosphere by asking
how they chose the university, how they conducted information search for academic purposes,
what type of club activities they were engaged in, and what role they played in such club activ-
ities. Based on the survey results, the following five indicators are introduced using scores of
relevant questions as specified for each indicator. Here scores are in scale of 1 through 10, and
the associated average for each indicator is defined as the value of the indicator.
IP1: Independence Point 1
Q1.1-1), Q1.2-1), Q1.2-5)
IP2: Independence Point 2
Q1.4-1), Q1.4-2), Q1.5-1), Q1.5-2)
Remark: For Q1.4-1) and Q1.4-2), the point is 10 if the answer is 1 or 2, and is 0 else.
SP1: Sympathy Point 1
Q1.1-2), Q1.1-3), Q1.2-2), Q1.2-3), Q1.2-4)
SP2: Sympathy Point 2
Q1.5-3), Q1.5-4)
SL: Sensitivity to Local Atmosphere
Q1.5-5), Q1.5-6)
For classification purposes, the threshold values of the five indicators are defined. For no-
tational convenience, let W (i) be the score of the i-th student for indicator W , and we write
TH(W ) to denote the threshold value of W where W=IP1, IP2, ... etc.
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(4.1) µ(W ) = 1
149
149
∑
i=1
W (i); σ(W ) =
√√√√ 1
148
149
∑
i=1
(W (i)−µ(i))2
(4.2) For W = IP1, IP2 or SL, TH(W ) = µ(W )+σ(W ).
(4.3) For W = SP1 or SP2, TH(W ) = µ(W )−σ(W ).
The classification criterion for (4.2) is “ greater than or equal to ”, and that for (4.3) is “less
than or equal to”. Applying those indicator values of the individual students to the corespond-
ing threshold values together with self-claims by the students concerning which group they
thought they would belong to, an algorithm is developed for classifying the students into the
eight groups G(1) through G(8). This algorithm is summarized in Appendix C in a form of a
flow-chart. The resulting group formation is exhibited in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Group Formation Based on Survey
Population %
G(1): Convinced Approvers 11 7.4
G(2): Adaptable Approvers 66 44.3
G(3): Independent Approvers 13 8.7
G(4): Convinced Disapprovers 5 3.4
G(5): Adaptable Disapprovers 36 24.2
G(6): Independent Disapprovers 6 4.0
G(7): Local Opportunists 6 4.0
G(8): Global Opportunists 6 4.0
Total 149 100.0
With the group formation in Table 4.1, the parameter values in Table 3.2 and the voting pop-
ulation of 149, we are now in a position to run the simulation model. A few remarks are worth
noting.
1) While the mock public referendum was conducted over a period of 4 weeks, it is highly un-
likely for the students to discuss the issue outside class hours. Because of this reason, the unit
of time is taken to be one week, and we set K = 4.
2) Since K = 4 is rather small, the distinction of the initial, middle and final stage is discarded,
while Y−(l) and Y+(l) are employed as in Table 3.3.
3) The voting population of 149 is much smaller than 10,000 or more in the previous discus-
sions. Accordingly, it is necessary to redetermine the number of simulation runs needed to
obtain reliable resluts. As before, the first difference of the cumulative average of the first n-
runs for PV-R and that for V-R are depicted in Figure 4.1 as a function of n. One finds that
the relative error is contained within ±0.2% for n = 50 or more. Based on this observation, 50
simulation runs were made.
18
Figure 4.1: First Difference of the Cumulative Average of Pro-Vote Ratio and Voting Ratio
In Table 4.2, the actual voting resluts of PV-R∗= 53.69 % and V −R∗= 88.59 % are summa-
rized in the second column. The third column exhibits the silumation results besed on the group
formation given in Table 4.1, with PV-R = 53.15 % and V-R = 86.88 %. One may conclude
that the reality of the mock public referendum was well captured by the parametric simulation
approach.
Table 4.2: Comparison of Simulation Results with Actucal Result
Group Formation Group Formation
Actual Based on Survey Based on Estimation
Pro-Vote Ratio (%) 53.69 53.15 51.65
Voting Ratio (%) 88.59 86.88 88.10
The experiment of the mock public referendum can also provide an opportunity to examine
how reliable the estimation procedure of Subsection 3.3 may be, where the group formation is
estimated given the voting outcome of (PV-R∗, V-R∗). In Table 4.3, the group formation ob-
tained by the algorithm in Appendix C using the survey resluts is compared with the group for-
mation constructed by the estimation procedure. While the maximum estimation error amounts
to 7.3%, or the over-estimation of 11 students for G(2), this error seems to result from misinter-
pretation of G(3) as G(2), and to be contained within Pro-Groups. Similar observations can be
made for other estimation errors. Indeed, the estimation errors of the sub-totals of G(1),G(2)
and G(3) for Pro-Groups, G(4),G(5) and G(6) for Con-Groups and G(7) and G(8) for Neutral
Groups are contained within 1.0% of surprising accuracy. Simulation results using this estima-
tional formation are given in the last column of Table 4.2, demonstrating consistency strongly.
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Table 4.3: Group Formation: Survey vs. Estimation
Survey (%) Estimation (%)
(a) (b) (a) - (b)
G(1): Convinced Approvers 7.4 6.7 0.7
G(2): Adaptable Approvers 44.3 51.6 -7.3
G(3): Independent Approvers 8.7 3.1 5.7
Pro-Total 60.4 61.4 -1.0
G(4): Convinced Disapprovers 3.4 6.7 -3.3
G(5): Adaptable Disapprovers 24.2 22.6 1.6
G(6): Independent Disapprovers 4.0 1.3 2.7
Con-Total 31.6 30.6 1.0
G(7): Local Opportunists 4.0 4.5 -0.5
G(8): Global Opportunists 4.0 3.5 0.5
Neutral-Total 8.0 8.0 0.0
5 Impact of Formation of Residential Groups on Public Referendum and
Strategic Implications
In this section, the parametric simulation approach discussed in the previous sections is em-
ployed to examine how the formation of the eight residential groups would affect the outcome
of public voting.
In Figure 5.1, the group formations of the nine replesentative models (Urban, Rural, Max-
Vote) x (Con-Type, Basic-Type, Pro-Type) are plotted. We note that those with independent
mind or less concern decrease as the model moves vertically from the Urban model to the Max-
Vote model. More specifically, one has G(1) ↑, G(2) ↑, G(3) ↓, G(4) ↑, G(5) ↑, G(6) ↓, G(7) ↓
and G(8) ↓ from the bottom to the top. As the model moves horizontally from Con-Type to
Pro-Type, the transfer from G(5) to G(2) and that from G(6) to G(3) occur increasingly.
Simulation results with 10 day campaign period are discussed here since those with 5 day
capmiagn results have the same trends. Simulation results of (PV-R, V-R) are depicted in Fig-
ure 5.2 for 9 x 11 = 99 models constructed from the three basic models via the horizontal and
vertical expansions as discussed in Subsection 3.2. It should be noted that, for each horizontal
expansion, the opposing party wins in the public referendum for the models on the left-side of
the basic model since one has PV-R < V−R2 . We call these models L-models of a horizontal
expansion. In contrast, for the basic model and the models on the right-side of it, which we call
BR-models of a horizontal expansion, one sees that PV-R > V−R2 and the supporting party wins.
For each horizontal expansion, L-models and BR-models may be approximated by two sep-
arate lines via the least-square method. Figure 5.3 illustrates these lines and the leading coef-
ficients are plotted in Figure 5.4. It can be seen that the leading coefficients for L-models are
almost zero for all the models, while those for BR-models are monotonically decreasing as the
model moves vertically from Urban model to Max-Vote model, and are almost zero beyond
Rural model. Leading coefficients and constants are summarized in Table 5.1. These results
combined with the robustness of the parametric simulation approach in changes of the voting
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Figure 5.1: Group Formations of Nine Representative Models
Figure 5.2: L-Models vs. BR-Models: Simulation Results with 10 Day Campaign Period
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population then lead to the following observations:
Observation 5.1
As discussed in 3.3, given a voting reslut of (PV-R, V-R), the underliying formation of the
eight residential group can be estimated. Consequently, it is possible to device a strategy con-
cerning how to achieve a target voting result starting from an estimated current situation by
transforming the formation of the eight residential groups appropriately via campaign efforts
and the like.
Observation 5.2
When the supporting party is perceived to be in minority, it may be possible to increase
PV-R without necessarily increasing V-R. In this case, the focus should be on transforming
less-convinced disapprovers into approvers.
Observation 5.3
When V-R is expected to be low, say 60% or less, and the supporting party is perceived to
be close to a tie, it is difficult to increase PV-R without increasing V-R. In addition to the efforts
to convince people, general efforts to increase V-R would help. Using the coefficients in Table
5.1, one may estimate the desired V-R level so as to achieve a prespecified PV-R level.
Figure 5.3: Liner Approximation of L-Models and BR-Models: Simulation Results with 10 Day Campaign Period
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Figure 5.4: Leading Coefficients of L-Models vs. BR-Models: Simulation Results with 10 Day Campaign Period
Table 5.1: Leading Coefficients and Constants of L-Models and BR-Models: Simulation Results with 10 Day
Campaign Period
Model L-Model BR-Model
leading coeff. constant leading coeff. constant
8: Max-Vote Model 0.0186 93.76 0.0137 94.50
7 0.0019 86.84 0.0178 90.38
6 0.0077 83.54 0.0223 86.36
5: Rural Model 0.0006 78.59 0.0236 82.58
4 0.0096 73.26 0.1425 71.62
3 0.0105 68.10 0.1965 65.08
2 0.0105 62.98 0.3705 52.18
1 0.0089 57.86 0.4407 45.22
0: Urban Model 0.0005 52.86 0.4348 40.76
6 Conculding Remarks
Major findings of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) The parametric simulation approach developed in this paper is quite robust in changes of
the voting population. If the formation of the eight residential groups is kept intact, the voting
results of (Pro-Vote Ratio, Voting Ratio) remains almost the same regardless of the voting pop-
ulation.
2) The parametric simulation approach is validated via a mock public referendum which took
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place at School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University in the spring term involving 149
students. The issue was whether the final grade of a course entitled “ Introduction to Human
Ecology” should be determined by a term report or by an ordinary final exam. In comparison
with the actual voting result of (Pro-Vote Ratio, Voting Ratio) = (53.69 %, 88.59 %), based on
the set of the parameter values and the formation of the eight groups constructed from a survey,
the simulation produced the voting result of (Pro-Vote Ratio, Voting Ratio) = (53.15 %, 86.88
%), yielding satisfactory accuracy.
3) Given a voting result of (Pro-Vote Ratio, Voting Ratio), the parametric simulation ap-
proach enables one to estimate the underlying formation of the eight residential groups.
4) Consequently, it is possible to device a strategy concerning how to achieve a target voting
result starting from an estimated current situation by transforming the formation of the eight
residential groups appropriately via campaign efforts and the like.
5) When the supporting party is perceived to be in minority, it may be possible to increase
Pro-Vote Ratio without necessarily increasing Voting Ratio. In this case, the focus should be on
transforming less-convinced disapprovers into approvers.
6) When Voting Ratio is expected to be low, say 60% or less, and the supporting party is
perceived to be close to a tie, it is difficult to increase Pro-Vote Ratio without increasing Voting
Ratio. In addition to the efforts to convince people, general efforts to increase Voting Ratio
would help. Using the coefficients in Table 5.1, one may estimate the desired Voting Ratio level
so as to achieve a prespecified Pro-Vote Ratio level.
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Appendix
A Construction of Governing Transition Probability Matrices
Using the basic model described in Section 2, we now provide detailed specifics about how
to construct governing transition probability matrices α (l,u,v) in (2.9) for each G(l), which
collectively describe the behavioral characteristics of the group toward the voting date. We
call α (l,1,1) the basic transition probability matrix for G(l). In order to describe 9 matrices
succinctly, we introduce the following notation.
(A.1)
α (l,1,1) = α (l), α (l,1,2) = αˆ (l), α (l,1,3) = ˆαˆ (l)
α (l,2,1) = β (l), α (l,2,2) = ˆβ (l), α (l,2,3) = ˆˆβ (l)
α (l,3,1) = γ (l), α (l,3,2) = γˆ (l), α (l,3,3) = ˆγˆ (l)
It should be noted that the changes of the matrices in u over the three stages along the time axis
are denoted by Greek letters α , β and γ , and the changes of the matrices in v over the states
[SG(l)(k)]8l=1 are distinguished by α , αˆ and ˆαˆ . Throughout the paper, we assume that all the
residents, except those in G(1) and G(4), have not decided their voting position and are in state
0 at time k = 0.
G(1): Convinced Approvers
The residents in this group are determined to vote for YES and the corresponding diagram
is depicted in Figure A.1(1). Accordingly, the group has only one transition probability matrix
α (1) = α (1,u,v), independent of u and v, given by
(A.2) α (1) = [αmn(1)] =
 0 1 00 1 0
0 1 0

.
G(2): Adaptable Approvers
Figure A.1(2) illustrates the transition structure of individual residents in G(2). When the
voting position is not decided (i.e. one is in state 0) at time k, one may remain in state 0, move
to state 1 deciding to vote for YES, or move to state 2 deciding to vote for NO at time k+1. If
the voting position at time k is in state 2, one may remain in state 2 or switch to state 1 deciding
to vote for YES at time k+ 1. However, once a resident in G(2) decides to vote for YES, this
voting position will never be changed.
Reflecting the above transition structure and considering the fact that u = v = 1 at time
k = 0 since everyone except those in G(1) and G(4) are in state 0 at time 0, the basic transition
probability matrix α (2,1,1) may be defined as
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Figure A.1: Transition Structures of Residential Groups
(A.3) α (2) = [αmn(2)] =
 α00(2) p(2){1−α00(2)} {1− p(2)}{1−α00(2)}0 1 0
1− α˜00(2) q(2)α˜00(2) {1−q(2)}α˜00(2)

.
Naturally, one has 0 ≤ α00(2), α˜00(2), p(2),q(2) ≤ 1. In addition, we impose the condition
1
2 ≤ p(2),q(2) ≤ 1 so that the probability of moving from state 0 to state 1 (YES) would be
higher than that of moving from state 0 to state 2 (NO).
For capturing the changes over u = 1,2,3 along the time axis, three additional parameters
a(2),r(2),s(2) are introduced where one has 0 ≤ a(2), s(2)≤ 1 and 1 ≤ r(2). With notation in
(A.1), one sees that
(A.4)
β (2) = [βmn(2)] =
 a(2)α00(2) r(2)α01(2) 1−β00(2)−β01(2)0 1 0
α20(2)− s(2)α21(2) 1−β20(2)−β22(2) α22(2)− s(2)α21(2)

and
(A.5) γ (2)= [γmn(2)] =
 a(2)β00(2) r(2)β01(2) 1− γ00(2)− γ01(2)0 1 0
β20(2)− s(2)β21(2) 1− γ20(2)− γ22(2) β22(2)− s(2)β21(2)

.
26
When a resident in G(2) is either in state 0 or state 2, the transition probability to state 1
increases over the three stages along the time axis. Because of the nature of G(2), one also
expects that, for u,v ∈ {1,2,3}, α (2,u,v) are stochastic matrices satisfying
(A.6) αm1(2,u,v)≥ αm2(2,u,v), m ∈ {0,1,2},
reflecting the tendency to vote for YES with higher probabbility. After a little algebra, the
following necessary and sufficient condition can be found for securing (A.6).
(A.7)
max{ 1−a(2)α00(2)2p(2){1−α00(2)} ,
√
1−a2(2)α00(2)
2p(2){1−α00(2)} ,1}< r(2)≤ min{
1−a(2)α00(2)
p(2){1−α00(2)} ,
√
1−a2(2)α00(2)
p(2){1−α00(2)}},
0 ≤ s(2)≤
−1+
√
1+3q(2)α00(2)
q(2)α00(2)
2 .
Stochastic matrices αˆ (2) and ˆαˆ (2) are treated in a similar manner as u changes with the con-
straints in (A.7) modified accordingly.
The residents of G(2) tend to move to state 1 as the ratio of the number of approvers among⋃
l∈I(2)
G(l) increases. In order to reflect this tendency, stochastic matrices α (2,u,v) are changed
as v increases from 1 to 3. We recall that α (2) = α (2,1,1), αˆ (2) = α (2,1,2) and ˆαˆ (2) =
α (2,1,3) as introduced in (A.1).
(A.8)
αˆ (2) = [αˆmn(2)] =
 b(2)α00(2) 1− αˆ00(2)− αˆ02(2) ˜b(2)α02(2)0 1 0
α20(2)+ t(2){1−w(2)}α22(2) α21(2)+{1− t(2)}{1−w(2)}α22(2) w(2)α22(2)

and
(A.9)
ˆαˆ (2) = [ ˆαˆmn(2)] =
 b(2)αˆ00(2) 1− ˆαˆ00(2)− ˆαˆ02(2) ˜b(2)αˆ02(2)0 1 0
αˆ20(2)+ t(2){1−w(2)}αˆ22(2) αˆ21(2)+{1− t(2)}{1−w(2)}αˆ22(2) w(2)αˆ22(2)

.
Here when a resident in G(2) is in state 0, the transition probabilities to state 0 or state 2 for v= 2
are reduced by a factor of b(2), 0 ≤ b(2)≤ 1, in comparison with those for v = 1. The reduced
probabilities are added to the transition probability to state 1. When the current voting position
is NO in state 2, the self- transition probability is reduced by a factor of w(2),0≤w(2)≤ 1, as v
changes from 1 to 2. The reduced probability is split between state 0 with weight t(2) and state
1 with weight 1− t(2). The transformation mechanism from αˆ (2) to ˆαˆ (2) as v changes from 2
to 3 is identical. Stochastic matrices β (2) and γ (2) are treated in a similar manner. Table A.1
exhibits the nine stochastic matrices for G(2), summarizing these transformation mechanisms.
G(3): Independent Approvers
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Table A.1: Stochastic Matrices for G(2)
v=1 v=2 v=3
0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
0 α00 α01 α02 αˆ00 αˆ01 αˆ02 ˆαˆ00 ˆαˆ01 ˆαˆ02
= p(1−α00) = (1− p)(1−α00) = bα00 = 1− αˆ00 − αˆ02 = ˜bα02 = bαˆ00 = 1− ˆαˆ00 − ˆαˆ02 = ˜bαˆ02
u=1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 α20 α21 α22 αˆ20 αˆ21 αˆ22 ˆαˆ20 ˆαˆ21 ˆαˆ22
= 1− α˜00 = qα˜00 = (1−q)α˜00 = α20 + t(1−w)α22= α21 +(1− t)(1−w)α22= wα22 = αˆ20 + t(1−w)αˆ22= αˆ21 +(1− t)(1−w)αˆ22= wαˆ22
0 β00 β01 β02 ˆβ00 ˆβ01 ˆβ02 ˆˆβ00 ˆˆβ01 ˆˆβ02
= aα00 = rα01 = 1−β00 −β01 = bβ00 = 1− ˆβ00 − ˆβ02 = ˜bβ02 = b ˆβ00 = 1− ˆˆβ00 − ˆˆβ02 = ˜b ˆβ02
u=2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 β20 β21 β22 α20 ˆβ21 ˆβ22 ˆˆβ20 ˆˆβ21 ˆˆβ22
= α20 − sα21= 1−β20 −β22 = α22 − sα21 = β20 + t(1−w)β22 = β21 +(1− t)(1−w)β22 = wβ22 = ˆβ20 + t(1−w) ˆβ22 = ˆβ21 +(1− t)(1−w) ˆβ22 = w ˆβ22
0 γ00 γ01 γ02 γˆ00 γˆ01 γˆ02 ˆγˆ00 ˆγˆ01 ˆγˆ02
= aβ00 = raβ01 = 1− γ00 − γ01 = bγ00 = 1− γˆ00 − γˆ02 = ˜bγ02 = bγˆ00 = 1− ˆγˆ00 − ˆγˆ02 = ˜bγˆ02
u=3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 γ20 γ21 γ22 γ20 γˆ21 γˆ22 γ20 ˆγˆ21 ˆγˆ22
= β20 − sβ21 = 1− γ20 − γ22 = β22 − sβ21 = γ20 + t(1−w)γ22 = γ21 +(1− t)(1−w)γ22 = wγ22 = γˆ20 + t(1−w)γˆ22 = γˆ21 +(1− t)(1−w)γˆ22 = wγˆ22
As shown in Figure A.1(3), the transition structure for G(3) is the same as that for G(2).
Accordingly, we set the structure of the basic transition matrix of G(3) identical to that of G(2).
In addition, the residents of G(3) share the same tendency as those of G(2) to move to state 1
with higher probability as time goes by , and hence, the transformation mechanism as u changes
from 1 to 3 is also similar. One has:
(A.10) α (3) = [αmn(3)] =
 α00(3) p(3){1−α00(3)} {1− p(3)}{1−α00(3)}0 1 0
1− α˜00(3) q(3)α˜00(3) {1−q(3)}α˜00(3)

,
(A.11)
β (3) = [βmn(3)] =
 a(3)α00(3) r(3)α01(3)) 1−β00(3)−β01(3)0 1 0
α20(3)− s(3)α21(3) 1−β20(3)−β22(3) α22(3)− s(3)α21(3)

and
(A.12)
γ (3) = [γmn(3)] =
 a(3)β00(3) r(3)β01(3)) 1− γ00(3)− γ01(3)0 1 0
β20(3)− s(3)β21(3) 1− γ20(3)− γ22(3) β22(3)− s(2)β21(3)

.
The conditions in (A.7) can be rewritten accordingly.
The residents of G(3) differ from those of G(2) in that they are not influenced by others in
deciding their voting positions. Consequently, α (3,u,v) is independent of v so that
(A.13)

α (3) = αˆ (3) = ˆαˆ (3)
β (3) = ˆβ (3) = ˆˆβ (3)
γ (3) = γˆ (3) = ˆγˆ (3).
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As can be seen from Figures A.1(4) through A.1(6), the groups G(4),G(5) and G(6) are sim-
ilar to G(1),G(2) and G(3) respectively in their transition structure, except that the transition
structure from/to state 0 is interchanged with the transition structure from/to state 1. Accord-
ingly, we construct the transition probability matrices for these groups in the following manner.
G(4): Convinced Disapprovers
This group has only one transition probability matrix α (4) = α (4,u,v), independent of u
and v, given by
(A.14) α (4) = [αmn(4)] =
 0 0 10 0 1
0 0 1

.
G(5): Adaptable Disapprovers
The basic transition probability matrix α (5,1,1) = α (5) may be defined as
(A.15) α (5) = [αmn(5)] =
 α00(5) p(5)(1−α00(5)) {1− p(5)}{1−α00(5)}1− α˜00(5) q(5)α˜00(5) {1−q(5)}α˜00(5)
0 0 1

.
Naturally, one has 0 ≤ α00(5), α˜00(5), p(5),q(5) ≤ 1. In addition, we impose the condition
0 ≤ p(5),q(5) ≤ 12 so that the probability of moving from state 0 to state 2 (NO) would be
higher than that of moving from state 0 to state 1 (YES).
For capturing the changes over u = 1,2,3 along the time axis, three additional parameters
a(5),r(5),s(5) are introduced where, for 0 ≤ a(5),s(5)≤ 1 and 1 ≤ r(5), we define:
(A.16)
β (5) = [βmn(5)] =
 a(5)α00(5) 1−β00(5)−β01(5) r(5)α02(5))α10(5)− s(5)α12(5) α11(5)− s(5)α12(5) 1−β10(5)−β11(5)
0 0 1

and
(A.17)
γ (5) = [γmn(5)] =
 a(5)β00(5) r(5)β01(5)) 1− γ00(5)− γ02(5)β10(5)− s(5)β12(5) β11(5)− s(5)β12(5) 1− γ10(5)− γ11(5)
0 0 1

.
Because of the nature of G(5), in contrast with (A.6), one expects that, for u,v ∈ {1,2,3},
α (5,u,v) are stochastic matrices satisfying
(A.18) αm1(5,u,v)≤ αm2(5,u,v), m ∈ {0,1,2}.
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After a little algebra, the following necessary and sufficient condition can be found for securing
(A.18).
(A.19)

max{ 1−a(5)α00(5)2{1−p(5)}{1−α00(5)} ,
√
1−a2(5)α00(5)
2{1−p(5)}{1−α00(5)} ,1}< r(5)≤
min{ 1−a(5)α00(5){1−p(5)}{1−α00(5)} ,
√
1−a2(5)α00(5)
{1−p(5)}{1−α00(5)}},
0 ≤ s(5)≤
−1+
√
1+3{1−q(5)}α00(5)
{1−q(5)}α00(5)
2 .
Stochastic matrices αˆ (5) and ˆαˆ (5) are treated in a similar manner as u changes with the con-
straints in (A.19) modified appropriately.
The residents of G(5) tend to move to state 2 as the ratio of the number of disapprovers
among
⋃
l∈I(5)
G(l) increases. In order to reflect this tendency, stochastic matrices α (5,u,v) are
changed as v increases from 1 to 3 in parallel with (A.8) and (A.9). Keeping this in mind, we
define:
(A.20)
αˆ (5) = [αˆmn(5)] =
 b(5)α00(5) ˜b(5)α01(5) 1− αˆ00(5)− αˆ01(5)α10(5)+ t(5)(1−w(5))α11(5) w(5)α11(5) α12(5)+{1− t(5)}{1−w(5)}α11(5)
0 0 1

and
(A.21)
ˆαˆ (5) = [ ˆαˆmn(5)] =
 b(5)αˆ00(5) ˜b(5)αˆ01(5) 1− ˆαˆ00(5)− ˆαˆ01(5)αˆ10(5)+ t(5){1−w(5)}αˆ11(5) w(5)αˆ11(5) αˆ12(5)+{1− t(5)}{1−w(5)}αˆ11(5)
0 0 1
 .
β (5,u,v) and γ (5,u,v) are treated similarly.
G(6): Independent Disapprovers
We set the structure of the basic transition matrix of G(6) identical to that of G(5). The
transformation mechanism as u changes from 1 to 3 is also similar. One has:
(A.22) α (6) = [αmn(6)] =
 α00(6) p(6){1−α00(6)} {1− p(6)}{1−α00(6)}1− α˜00(6) q(6)α˜00(6) {1−q(6)}α˜00(6)
0 0 1

,
(A.23)
β (6) = [βmn(6)] =
 a(6)α00(6) 1−β00(6)−β02(6) r(6)α02(6))α10(6)− s(6)α12(6) α11(6)− s(6)α12(6) 1−β10(6)−β12(6)
0 0 1

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and
(A.24)
γ (6) = [γmn(6)] =
 a(6)β00(6) 1− γ00(6)− γ02(6) r(6)β02(6))β10(6)− s(6)β12(6) β11(6)− s(6)β12(6) 1− γ10(6)− γ12(6)
0 0 1

.
The conditions in (A.19) can be rewritten accordingly. Because of the underlying independence,
one has α (6,u,v) being independent of v so that
(A.25)

α (6) = αˆ (6) = ˆαˆ (6)
β (6) = ˆβ (6) = ˆˆβ (6)
γ (6) = γˆ (6) = ˆγˆ (6).
G(7): Local Opportunists
The residents in this group make their voting decisions by observing the ratio of approvers
in their own group as well as in G(2), G(3), G(5) and G(6). The structure of the basic matrix
is identical with other groups except G(1) and G(4).
(A.26) α (7) = [αmn(7)] =
 α00(7) p(7){1−α00(7)} {1− p(7)}{1−α00(7)}1− α˜00(7) q(7)α˜00(7) {1−q(7)}α˜00(7)
1− α˜00(7) q˜(7)α˜00(7) {1− q˜(7)}α˜00(7)

,
However, the parameter p(7) affecting the transition probability from state 0 (Undecided)
to state 1 (YES) takes a value different from p(2) for G(2) and p(5) for G(5), satisfying
p(5)< p(7)< p(2). This reflects the fact that, when a resident is in state 0 without any decision
yet, those in G(7) are more undecided than those in G(2) having inclination to state 1 (YES) or
those in G(5) with inclination to state 2 (NO).
In constructing β (7) = α (7,2,1) and γ (7) = α (7,3,1), the transition probability structure
in state 0 is identical to the basic matrix α (7) = α (7,1,1), while the transition probability
structure in state 1 is identical to that of G(5) and that in state 2 is identical to that of G(2). One
has:
(A.27)
β (7) = [βmn(7)] =
 α00(7) α01(7) α02(7)α10(7)− s(7)α11(7) 1−β10(7)1−β12(7) α12(7)− s(7)α11(7)
α20(7)− s˜(7)α22(7) α21(7)− s˜(7)α22(7) 1−β20(7)1−β21(7)

,
and
(A.28)
γ (7) = [γmn(7)] =
 β00(7) β01(7) β02(7)β10(7)− s(7)β11(7) 1− γ10(7)1− γ12(7) β12(7)− s(7)β11(7)
β20(7)− s˜(7)β22(7) β21(7)− s˜(7)β22(7) 1− γ20(7)1− γ21(7)

.
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Because of the nature of G(7), one expects that for 1 ≤ u,v,≤ 3,
(A.29)
 α01(7,u,v) = α02(7,u,v)α11(7,u,v)≥ α12(7,u,v)α21(7,u,v)≤ α22(7,u,v).
The conditions (3.7) hold true if and only if
(A.30)

p(7) = 12 ,
0 ≤ s(7)≤
−1+
√
1+3{1−q(7)}α00(7)
{1−q(7)}α00(7)
2 ,
0 ≤ s˜(7)≤
−1+
√
1+3{1−q(7)}α00(7)
{1−q(7)}α00(7)
2 .
For αˆ (7) = α (7,1,2) and ˆαˆ (7) = α (7,1,3), the transition probability from state 0 to state 0 or
state 2 is decreased by a factor b(7), with the resulting decreased probabilies added to the tran-
sition probability from state 0 to state 1. In state 1, the transition probability structure is similar
except that b(7) is replaced by ˜b(7) with ˜b(7) ≥ b(7). For state 2, the transition probability
structure is similar to that of αˆ (2) and ˆαˆ (2) for G(2). We define that:
(A.31)
αˆ (7) = [αˆmn(7)] =
 b(7)α00(7) 1− αˆ00(7)− αˆ02(7) b(7)α02(7))˜b(7)α10(7) 1− αˆ10(7)− αˆ12(7) ˜b(7)α02(7))
α20(7)+ t(7){1−w(7)}α22(7) α21(7)+{1− t(7)}{1−w(7)}α22(7) w(7)α22(7)

,
(A.32)
ˆαˆ (7) = [ ˆαˆmn(7)] =
 b(7) ˆα00(7) 1− ˆαˆ00(7)− ˆαˆ02(7) b(7) ˆα02(7))˜b(7) ˆα10(7) 1− ˆαˆ10(7)− ˆαˆ12(7) ˜b(7)αˆ02(7))
αˆ20(7)+ t(7){1−w(7)}αˆ22(7) αˆ21(7)+{1− t(7)}{1−w(7)}αˆ22(7) w(7)αˆ22(7)

.
G(8): Global Opportunists
The probabilistic structure of G(8) in forming their voting positions is identical to that of
G(7), except that the likelihood of voting for YES would be increased by the ratio of approvers
among the entire population rather than the subset
⋃
l∈I(7)
G(l) in case of G(7). The relevant pa-
rameters for G(8) may take values different from those for G(7).
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B Questionnaire
Questionnaire: Week 1
Q1.1 Why did you choose School of Policy Studies at Kwansei
Gakuin University to enter? For each factor below,
please indicate the level of importance in your decision
by marking one number on the right.
not important very
at all important
1) Because the curriculum matched with my career plan. 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
2) Because my friend recommended. 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
3) Because my parents or teachers recommended. 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
Q1.2 In writing class essays and term papers, what would be your
typical information sources? For each factor below,
please indicate the level of importance by marking one
number on the right.
1) Library 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
2) Professors 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
3) Senior students 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
4) Classmates 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
5) Massmedia such as TV and newspapers 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
Q1.3 Do you participate in any club activities?
1) Yes
2) No
Q1.4 If you answered YES in Q1.3, what is your role in
the club? Please choose one.
1) A leader
2) A sub-leader
3) A member
Q1.5 Why did you join the club? For each factor below,
please indicate the level of importance in your decision
by marking one number on the right.
1) Because I organized it. 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
2) Because the club matched with my interest. 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
3) Because my friend recommended. 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
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4) Because my parents or professors recommended. 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
5) Because the club seemed interesting. 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
6) Because I had nothing to do else. 1–2–3–4–5–6–7–8–9–10
Q1.6 Concerning how to determine the final grade of this course, please choose one below that
suits you best at this point in time.
1) An ordinary in-class closed-book final exam. The difficulty level of the final exam
would be equal to that of last year.
2) A term report to be written and submitted over a five day period. The difficulty level
of the term report would be higher than that of the final exam.
3) I haven’t decided yet.
Q1.7 Through Week 1 to Week 4, which group below do you think you would belong to?
1) Those who strongly support the term report and will try to convince others.
2) Those who may be convinced to choose the term report.
3) Those who support the term report without influencing others or being influenced by
others.
4) Those who strongly support the in-class closed-book final exam and will try to con-
vince others.
5) Those who may be convinced to choose the in-class closed-book final exam.
6) Those who oppose the in-class closed-book final exam without influencing others or
being influenced by others.
7) Those who are undecided, and may have a tendency to be influenced by close friends.
8) Those who are undecided, and may have a tendency to be influenced by the whole
class atmosphere.
Questionnaire: Week 2 through Week 4
Q2.1 / Q3.1 / Q4.1
Concerning how to determine the final grade of this course, please choose one below that
suits you best at this point in time.
1) An ordinary in-class closed-book final exam. The difficulty level of the final exam
would be equal to that of last year.
2) A term report to be written and submitted over a five day period. The difficulty level
of the term report would be higher than that of the final exam.
3) I haven’t decided yet.
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C Flow Chart of Algorithm for Classifying the 149 students into 8 Groups
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